Concept of matter and concept of power

Although modern philosophers mainly find the concept of mind problematic, the concept of matter, when they think about it, proves to be even worse. Hume pointed out that, once secondary qualities are disqualified from being intrinsic qualities of matter, what is left - spatial properties and impenetrability - gives one a purely dispositional conception. This, he argued, was circular or regressive. The situation gets, if anything, worse, when one confronts a modern as opposed to Newtonian conception of matter, as forces, fields, energy etc. I argued against such an account of matter in ch.7 of MATTER AND SENSE more than twenty years ago, but there has been quite a lot of more recent discussion on the '"powers" conception of matter', and I want to bring the debate up to date. Howard Robinson előadásáról részletek a szeminárium honlapján.