Conference on Truth, Reference & Realism

It is a widely held view in contemporary analytic philosophy that there is a specific problem resulting from our general epistemological interest, on the one hand, and the semantics of our claims about causally inert, abstract states of affairs, on the other. The problem is the following: whatever faculty provides us with evidence about the apparently verification-transcendent truths of these abstract domains, we cannot hope to develop a controllable theory of epistemic mistakes until we have some idea about the nature of those mechanisms that underlie our access to the relevant truth-conditions. A causal account of access would certainly ease these epistemological worries, but the naturalistic construal of the truth-conditions of logic, mathematics, ethics, semantics or epistemology has proved to be rather problematic in the light of our semantic conceptions of content, truth-condition or reference. The conference invites contributions discussing the available strategies of treating this problem while formulating a theory of truth for these non-empirical fields. Részletek a konferencia honlapján találhatók.