Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry

A CEU Filozófia Tanszéke és a Center for Hellenic Traditions tisztelettel meghívja Filip GRGIC Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry című előadására.
Időpont: 2007. január 16., kedd, 5 óra
Helyszín: CEU, Zrínyi u. 14, 412. terem


At the beginning of the second book of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus Empiricus raises the question how can the Pyrrhonist inquire into something of which he has no knowledge. This is a question of vital importance for the Pyrrhonists, who insist that we should suspend judgment about everything and who characterize themselves as perpetual inquirers. I will discuss Sextus' solution to this problem. He seems to accept the idea that in order to inquire into something one must have some concept of it, and that such an antecedent concept does not imply the existence of its object. I will try to show that this is just a dialectical concession to his opponents.

FILIP GRGIC is a research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb and a visiting lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka. His research interest is in ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle and skepticism. His publications include articles in Ancient Philosophy, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Phronesis and elsewhere.